Our Supreme Court has often enough seemed to say the same thing, and just over half a century ago it emphatically rebuked President Truman's effort to avoid national calamity by emergency action during the Korean War with the comment that 'the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker ' . 3 Yet with only two exceptions, both of which occurred in the early days of the New Deal, the Court has resolutely refused to find unconstitutional Congress's placement in administrative agencies of the authority to adopt regulations that, if valid, have the full force of statutes. Although frequently finding relatively constrained interpretations of the scope of such grants, as one means of containing them, it has in effect denied that judicially administrable standards exist by which to measure the validity of such delegations. Most recently, it has acknowledged that the rulemaking they authorize involves the exercise of executive, not legislative, power. 4 It has in effect celebrated the delegations, making clear that so long as the appearance of legality can be 2 Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690).
3 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer 343 US 579, 72 S Ct 863 (1952) . 4 
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 maintained it will accept them. Effectively, the only question for courts is whether an administrative act is infra vires, not whether it can be permitted at all. If our President is not to be a lawmaker, an agency can be.
This outcome can hardly be surprising. In the American legal system, as virtually all others, one can observe a hierarchy of textual instruments created for and/or by the government, and having the force of law or, if not quite that force, significant influence over how citizens and corporations conduct their affairs. This hierarchy might be depicted in the following way:
One Constitution ratified by 'the people'
Hundreds of statutes enacted by an elected Congress
Thousands of regulations adopted by politically responsible executive officials
Tens of thousands of interpretations and guidance documents issued by responsible bureaus
Countless advice letters, press releases, and other statements of understanding generated by individual bureaucrats
Yet familiar as this pattern may be, it must be evident that there is considerable tension between our acceptance of it and the proposition that the President, responsible for execution of the laws, is not to be a lawmaker. And that tension became virtually unbearable in the framework of the strong 'unitary President' idea advanced by President Bush and Vice President Cheney during the administration that has now thankfully drawn to a close. That idea, as you probably know, is that the President is entitled to be 'the decider', not merely an overseer, of matters that the  Congress may have committed to the responsibility of any administrative agency. While there are considerable differences to a Prime Minister's role in parliamentary systems, my sense is that the frequent intransitivity of regulatory statutes in such systems as well as in ours -so that parliaments, too, create lawmakers as much as they do laws -must have real consequences for those legal systems, as well as for ours, concerning one's ideas about constitutionalism and the 'rule of law' in the regulatory state. So this is what I mean to talk about here.
Distinguishing Between Politics and Law in the American Administrative State
The American Constitution radically separates executive and legislative authorities in a manner quite strange to parliamentary systems of government. Under the Constitution, the American Congress has no responsibility for rulemaking beyond its creation by statute of legal authority for executive actions (such as rulemaking), its provision of budgetary support for government actions, its power to countermand regulations by statute, 5 and its informal oversight of agency actions through investigative hearings and the like. Members of Congress, like any member of the public, may attempt to influence rulemaking outcomes by commentary; but once they have authorized rulemaking to occur, its fruition as a legal matter is strictly an issue for the 5 That is, if an agency adopts a regulation, Congress's only power of disapproval is by statutory enactment. 'Laying before' procedures of a less formal sort are constitutionally unavailable.
 executive. And the Constitution is explicit that members of Congress are forbidden to hold executive office. Thus, the difference between the second and third levels of the hierarchy sketched above is quite dramatic. Congress legislates; but rulemaking is an executive activity.
6
Analysts from parliamentary systems draw a distinction between 'political' and 'administrative' (or bureaucratic) controls of regulatory bodies. They tend to ascribe 'political' control to the parliament, and 'administrative' control to executive actors, who are understood in a more technical than political sense. This is natural in a system in which ministerial and legislative terms of office are interdependent, and only legislators are elected (even if it may be known in advance which person or persons, if elected with majority legislative support, will assume executive office). In parliamentary systems, moreover, executive governance may usually be imagined as somewhat collegial in character; a 'prime' minister's government depends on continuing consensus among all ministers and the support of the legislators who have elected her.
This interdependency with the legislature and this collegial character of the executive are not to be found in the United States. Our President and the members of Congress are separately elected, in each case to fixed terms of office. These terms do not coincide -two years for the 6 Federal Courts also adopt regulations, but these concern judicial procedures, evidence, etc, and are not directly addressed to private conduct. There are, indeed, many respects in which the techniques of American rulemaking facilitate these propositions. As a general matter, agencies engaged in rulemaking must make available to the public, in advance, the data available to them on the basis of which they expect to act, and a suggestion what it is they propose to do. They must then receive public comment on their proposal. In subsequently acting, they must provide a reasoned explanation of the conclusions they have reached, which in practice must include an explanation of any departure from important commentary they may have received. 14 Not one of these propositions would be true in the legislative context. Should review of the legality of an agency's action then be sought, it will be assessed not just in terms of the Constitution, but also of compliance with required procedure, of fit with statutory authority, and of reasonable exercise of judgment within that authority, given the relevant facts and views. No such 'hard look', 15 as it is often described, is called for when powers has occurred'. (internal quotations omitted)).
14 5 USC s 553. Increasingly, this process and the documents associated with it may be followed, and submissions to it may be made, on the Internet, <www.regulations.gov>.
This term originated in decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, which -sitting in the nation's capital -has a high concentration of administrative law business (it is, however, a generalist court like the other circuit courts of appeal, and not an  the constitutionality of legislation is challenged.
Thus, to take an example well known to American students of administrative law, the Clean Air Act tasks the EPA with identifying and regulating sources of air pollution 'which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare'. 2856 (1983) . In the words of an EPA attorney, courts will 'inquire into the minute details of methodology, data sufficiency and test procedure and will send the regulations back if these are lacking'. WF Pedersen, 'Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking' (1976) The increased use of rulemaking is, from one perspective, a natural consequence of our increased awareness of social interdependence and environmental hazard. At the same time as human existence has come to involve more artificial elements of uncertain long-term effect, we have developed greater technological capacities to discern and evaluate risk. The great increase in rulemaking occurred, precisely, at the time of the great outpouring of health, safety and environmental legislation in the United States that marked the 1960's and 1970's. Whatever the Nineteenth Century's contributions to global warming, industrial disease, and other ills, the  people of that time had fewer tools with which to detect them (and, perhaps, more immediate and evident hazards to which to respond). The judgments we want to reach in consequence of our growing knowledge about and sensitivity to risk -to continue one example already mentioned, how much ozone is safe to permit in the atmosphere we breathe -involve too much detail to be entrusted to the vote of an elected, generalist legislature's politicians. Inevitably, as the pyramidal figure opening this essay may suggest, we expect political legislatures to set general standards for determinations of this sort, and to leave it to experts -i.e., administration -to find the precise levels for particular substances, like ozone, that those standards make appropriate.
The severance of executive from legislative function in the United States (or, to put it another way, the political irresponsibility of American legislators for rulemaking's particular outcomes)
introduces a reinforcing temptation to rely on rulemaking -one that is much celebrated in the American scholarship on 'public choice'. The only political necessity for Congress to earn public credit for 'action' is to appear to have dealt with a problem. It need not actually have done as much as it might have by way of political resolution of issues. It can then point the finger of blame elsewhere should things not work out so well. In consequence, some of the work that ideally ought to be politically resolved, at the second level of the hierarchy above, is passed on to the third.
We have discovered no effective corrective for this institutional failure. The logical  candidate would be a constitutional limitation on Congress's power to confer authority on executive government. 21 As already indicated, however, the rubric of the 'delegation' doctrine suffices only to prevent the conferring of DISCRETION! in contexts where courts will conclude that they must be in a position to determine the legality of government behaviour -that is, where they will conclude that for executive power to be tolerated, there must be law to apply.
Government lawyers thus rarely argue in any administrative context that judicial review is unavailable, but instead work to persuade the courts that agency behaviour meets the constraints of legality.
While there thus must be 'intelligible standards' to which government actors may be held,  · is subject to effective judicial review to only a limited degree;
· cannot be laid politically at the feet of Congress or the political party that at the moment head of the EPA, and who will have his own y tions are that the is rationalized by its being an act of judgment. My own conclusion then, is that in ordinary administrative law contexts, where Congress has assigned a function to a named agency subject to its oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President's role -like that of the Congress and the courts -is that of overseer and not decider. 34 Our Constitution explicitly gives us a unitary head of state, but it leaves the framework of government almost completely to congressional design. Given a choice between President as overseer of the resulting assemblage, and President as necessarily entitled 'decider', the implicit message is that of oversight, not decision. The executive branch shall construe subsection 404(c) of title 39, as enacted by subsection 1010(e) of the Act, which provides for opening of an item of a class of mail otherwise sealed against inspection, in a manner consistent, to the maximum extent permissible, with the need to conduct searches in exigent circumstances, such as to protect human life and safety against hazardous materials, and the need for physical searches specifically authorized by law for foreign intelligence collection.
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 responsibilities, in my judgment, satisfy the undoubted constitutional specification of a unitary chief executive, while avoiding the executive tyranny horn of Corwin's dilemma.
An Increasingly Unitary Executive (?)
Of course it would rarely be the President himself who commands, but a political apparatus operating under his immediate control. Recent years have seen both a significant expansion of that apparatus in the White House itself, and much enlarged penetration of 'political clearances' into agency bureaucracies. 36 From the administration of President Ford (1974-77) forward, That is, as he had inherent authority to act to protect the nation, the statutory provision could be 
38
The increasing scope of political clearance for persons having policy responsibilities has attracted rather less attention, but certainly renders American 'administration' more political than would be expected in the strong civil service regimes of many parliamentary democracies. 38 Kagan (n 25 above).

Probably the move in this direction began during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, when a reform of the civil service laws created in the upper echelons of the civil service a Senior Executive Service, those persons responsible for policy direction and other matters involving substantial discretion. In the United States as in European democracies, important federal bureaus, elements perhaps of a cabinet department, might be under the direction of senior civil servants, permanent government employees rather than political appointees. 39 The new law made them more subject to reward and punishment, reassignment and direction, than they had previously been. While these persons were still nominally in the civil service (that is, they were still permanent employees), it is perhaps not surprising to learn that with the enlarged possibilities of reward and discipline from above, practices of political clearance developed: On the other hand, it remains unclear exactly how much power President Obama actually will relinquish. While he has restored OIRA to the role it played under President Clinton, even that regime did not lack critics of its politicizing and delay-promoting possibilities. 
